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While continuous separation for a specified period of time as a
basis for divorce has gained wide acceptance among the American
jurisdictions,' South Carolina divorce law up until now has
rested entirely on the concept of marital fault. This year, how-
ever, the state followed the trend by adopting a fifth ground for
divorce: three years' separation.2 The constitutional amendment
and the subsequent statute are premised on the judgment that a
marriage which has failed in fact should be legally terminable
without the presence of morally condemnable conduct. A couple
wanting a divorce can now get one without the traditional wife-
beating, desertion, adultery, collusion, or forum-shopping. Three
years' separation - a long period unsuited to easy, "quick"
divorces - is sufficient.
B. Jurisdiction
In Carnie v. Carnie3 the wife's attorney initiated a divorce
proceding against the husband by mailing copies of the summons
and complaint to him while he was stationed with the military in
Iran. A divorce decree, accompanied by alimony, child support,
and attorney's fees, was granted on grounds of desertion. Al-
l. For a partial list see M. PLoscows & D. Fymn, FAMILY LAW 193
(1963).
2. Following approval of the new ground by referendum, the amendment
was ratified and then S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (1962) was amended by R258,
May 2, 1969, so that it now reads:
No divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be granted except
upon one or more of the following grounds, to wit:
1) Adultery;
2) Desertion for a period of one year;
3) Physical cruelty;
4) Habitual drunkenness; provided, that this ground shall be
construed to include habitual drunkenness caused by the use of
any narcotic drug; or
5) On the application of either party if and when the husband
and wife have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for
a period of three continuous years. A plea of res judicata or
a recrimination with respect to any other provision of this
section shall not be a bar to either party obtaining a divorce
on this ground.
The amendment states that the time for computing the separation period can
be made without regard to the effective date of the act or ratification of the
amendment.
3. 167 S.E2d 297 (S.C. 1969).
1
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though the wife was a resident of South Carolina, her husband
was not, nor did he own property in the state.
Upon his return the husband appeared specially, claimed the
court lacked personal jurisdiction, but moved to strike only the
provisions of the decree granting alimony, child support, and
attorney's fees, leaving the divorce itself intact. The motion was
refused, but on appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed, stating that
a divorce decree which grants, in addition to the di-
vorce, alimony, child support and attorney's fees against
a nonresident defendant personally is, to that extent, a
judgment in personam, which may not be rendered
without jurisdiction of the person ....
[C]onstructive service in itself, whether made by pub-
lication or by actual service of process upon the defen-
dant outside the state, is insufficient to give jurisdiction
to render a judgment for alimony against a nonresident
which will be binding upon him except as to his prop-
erty within the jurisdiction.
4
The court doubted that jurisdiction had been obtained at all
and further observed that a divorce should not have been granted
on the scanty evidence presented,5 even if the lower court had
gained jurisdiction. Nevertheless, since the initial divorce had
been granted long ago, the court declined to reverse the divorce
portion of the decree, fearing that some innocent party might
have married in reliance upon it.
In a brief concurring opinion Justice Littlejohn flatly stated
that the lower court had never obtained jurisdiction and that the
entire decree was void.
0. Desertion
Bond v. Bond( presented the court with several issues, the first
of which concerned the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
decree of divorce on grounds of desertion. The court reversed,
finding that the wife and children left the husband by agree-
ment because of his financial straits and poor health, intending
to reunite when conditions improved. Separation by mutual
4. Id. at 299, quoting 24 Am. Jua. 2d Divorce and Separation § 544 (1966).
5. See Machado v. Machado, 220 S.C. 90, 66 S.E.2d 629 (1951).
6. 166 S.E2d 302 (S.C. 1969).
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consent doesn't constitute desertion, the essential elements of
which are: (1) cessation from cohabitation; (2) intent on the
part of the absenting spouse not to resume it; (3) absence of
consent by the deserted spouse; and (4) absence of justification.
7
The court found no showing that an intent to end the marriage
had existed for a period of one year before the institution of the
action. The court further held that, it retained the power to
determine the other issues in the case although the wife was
not entitled to a divorce, and upheld a grant of alimony 8 over
the husband's objections. An award of alimony is not precluded
upon a proper showing even though the wife fails to show that
she is entitled to a divorce on the ground of desertion.9 She
was also awarded attorney's fees even though she was gainfully
employed. It was uncontradicted that her earnings were insuffi-
cient to pay her attorney. The court found it unnecessary to
decide whether under the circumstances the wife's failure to
sustain her action for divorce deprived her of the right to an
allowance of attorney's fees but stated instead that such an
allowance could be sustained as an incident to the other issues
of the case -custody and support of the children,10 and claim
for alimony."- The court pointed out that gainful employment
does not automatically deprive a wife of the allowance of at-
torney's fees. Such an allowance remains in the discretion of the
trial court.12
D. Reconciliation and Condouation
If the plaintiff in a divorce action is shown to have condition-
ally pardoned the offending spouse, whether explicitly or im-
plicitly, for the matrimonial transgression upon which the suit
is based, then the defense of condonation is available.' 3 After
struggling through the appellant's brief in Neves 'v. Neves"4
the court concluded that there was no evidence of condonation
and affirmed the wife's divorce decree. The defendant had
failed to plead condonation and was thus limited to arguing
that such a defense was patently revealed in the record. After
7. Cleveland v. Cleveland, 238 S.C. 547, 121 S.E2d 98 (1961).
8. Referred to in some earlier cases under these circumstances as separate
maintenance.
9. Machado v. Machado, 220 S.C. 90, 66 S.E2d 629 (1951).
10. Sovereign v. Sovereign, 361 Mich. 528, 106 N.W.2d 146 (1961); Annot.,
82 A.L.R.2d 1088 (1962) (cited by the court).
11. Smith v. Smith, 51 S.C. 379, 29 S.E. 227 (1898).
12. Nienow v. Nienow, 245 S.C. 542, 141 S.E2d 648 (1965).
13. Odom v. Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E.2d 353 (1966).
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reaffirming its identification of condonation as "an affirma-
tive defense which should be pleaded"' 5 the court nonetheless
proceeded to examine the record for traces of forgiving conduct
by the wife. The court could find none, yet seemed ready,
despite the defendant's faulty pleadings, to reverse had con-
donation manifested itself in the record.
E. Adultery
Adultery must be proved by a clear preponderance of the evi-
dence.10 On appeal the court does not limit itself to deciding
whether the trial judge could reasonably have found what he
did, but will review the record anew for the required degree of
proof. In Mann . Mann17 the court reiterated the characteristics
of the clear and positive quantum of proof required: it must
identify the time, place, and circumstances of the act - yet it
may be partly or wholly circumstantial. 18 Although the court
declined to illuminate its opinion with a review of the record in
Mann, it seems inescapable that the plaintiff's inability to pin-
point the exact occasion of his wife's infidelity was fatal to his
cause. 10
II. CUSTODY
The South Carolina Supreme Court twice reversed lower
court decisions granting child custody to an adulterous wife.
Two justices dissented on both occasions.
In Johnson v. Johnson20 the husband won a divorce on
grounds of adultery and was granted custody of his two young
sons by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. The wife
appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the
divorce decree but awarded custody to the wife. On appeal the
South Carolina Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granting custody to the
father, since it was not contrary to the preponderance of the
15. Id. at 570.
16. Odom v. Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 146, 149 S.E.2d 353, 354 (1966); Lee v.
Lee, 237 S.C. 532, 535, 118 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1961).
17. 165 S.E.2d 632 (S.C. 1969).
18. Odom v. Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E2d 353 (1966). See also Domestic
Relations, 2966 Survey of South Carolina Law, 18 S.C.L. REv. 56 (1966).
19. The husband's proof was good enough for the master, whose decision
was first affirmed by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, then reversed
by the circuit court. The testimony is convincing, yet it lacks the specificity
the supreme court requires. See Record at 62ff.
20. 251 S.C. 420, 163 S.E.2d 229 (1968).
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evidence. The father, an engineer with a comfortable income,
was of uncontested fitness. In concluding that he should receive
custody the court relied heavily on facts of record such as: (1)
the husband desired his wife to refrain from working and to
stay home to care for the children; (2) during the divorce pro-
ceedings he continued his employment with his father-in-law,
and his wife admitted that her parents were still fond of him;
(3) he included a statement of his continuing love for his wife in
their separation agreement; (4) after the separation agreement
was concluded, the wife and her partner in adultery saw each
other frequently and traveled together. Such a record amply sup-
ported the family court judge's findings, which should not be
disturbed unless without evidentiary support or against the
clear weight of the evidence.21
Justices Bussey and Brailsford dissented, recommending a
rehearing since the record contained no evidence specifically
directed toward the question of fitness.
In Adams V. l2ifje242 the father was granted a Virginia di-
vorce on grounds of desertion. His wife received custody while
he retained visitation rights. But for about a year and a half
after the divorce, the husband did not know the whereabouts of
his ex-wife and children. When he finally found her living with
a married man, he instituted custody proceedings but lost in
the trial court. In reversing that judgment and granting custody
to the father, the supreme court noted that the wife had engaged
in immoral, illegal acts by committing adultery, fraudulently
renouncing dower by designating herself as the wife of her
lover, and concealing her and the children's whereabouts.
The court distinguished Langston v. Langsto 23 - another
custody case involving an adulterous wife. In Langston the
court had refused to reverse an award of custody to the adul-
teress, since she had been a good mother before and after her
21. S.C. CoNsT. art. 5, section 4 allows the supreme court to review findings
of fact as well as law in equity cases. The South Carolina Supreme Court, how-
ever has followed an apparently self-imposed limitation by frequently holding
that findings of fact made by a master or referee and concurred in by the trial
court will not be disturbed on appeal unless they appear to be without evidenti-
ary support or are against the clear preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g.,
Oswald v. Oswald, 230 S.C. 299, 95 S.E2d 493 (1956). The court must
decide issues according to its own view of the evidence when there is no
concurrent finding below. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 244 S.C.
265, 136 S.E.2d 537 (1964).
22. Smith's Advance Sheet #8 (March 1, 1969).
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infatuation. But in the present case the mother's long-term
notorious cohabitation, concealment of whereabouts, and fraudu-
lent renunciation of dower were considered decisive. The major-
ity concluded: "We cannot agree that the best interest of the
children would be served by granting custody to one whose
recent life is such an example of flagrant violation of the law
and the morality of contemporary society."24
While giving lip service to the principle that the best interest
of the child controls, the court seemed more interested in
assessing sexual blameworthiness than in ascertaining the effect
of the mother's conduct on her children. Persuasively dissenting,
Justice Bussey, joined by Justice Lewis, noted the absence of
anything in the record showing that the impropriety of their
mother's conduct had been brought home to her children, aged
3 and 6 at the time. The majority saw Mrs. Adams as a scan-
dalous adulteress who had no compunctions about falsely re-
nouncing dower. Justice Bussey saw a woman whose husband's
conduct, not her own, "was the greater causative factor in the
disruption of the marriage,112 i and drove her to behavior which,
though "far from excusable, ... is at least understandable."
26
The court disclaimed any interest in formulating a per se rule
which would automatically deny custody to an adulteress, yet,
as Justice Bussey pointed out, it is difficult to see how this
decision was guided by a factual consideration of the children's
welfare. By holding that a child's best interest cannot lie with a
mother like this one because she is guilty "of flagrant violation
of the law and the morality of contemporary society,"2 7 the
majority seems to reject the possibility that adulterous cohabita-
tion could ever consist with fitness as a parent.
28
III. ADOrTION
South Carolina's five-year-old adoption act 29 provides that
both parents, if living, must consent to the adoption of their
24. Adams v. Miller, Smith's Advance Sheet #8 (March 1, 1969) at 16.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 16.
28. The fact that the defendant's lover, a physician, had almost completed
the process of obtaining a divorce from his wife when the cohabitation began
and married the defendant as soon as he was free to do so made little impres-
sion on the majority but seemed significant to Justice Bussey. Quaere whether
the majority's "morality of contemporary society" standard for assessing the
child's best interests would require an opposite result if the contest were
between members of a sub-culture or socio-economic class which attached no
stigma to cohabitation under these circumstances.
29. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2587.1 to -2585.18 (Supp. 1968).
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legitimate child before the adoption can be decreed. But such
consent is not required from one whose parental rights have been
judicially terminated, "or from one who has been made a party
to the adoption proceeding and duly served. . . ."3 In Goff
v. Benedict,31 paternal grandparents sought to adopt their
granddaughter after her parents' divorce. Although the divorce
decree had granted custody to the father, the child had lived
with her grandparents continuously since her parents' initial
separation in 1962. When the mother refused to consent to the
proposed adoption, she was "made a party to the adoption pro-
ceeding and duly served." The trial court granted the adoption
despite the mother's continued refusal to consent.
In reversing the judgment of the lower court, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court reasoned that a parent's refusal to consent
to the child's adoption by someone else cannot be ignored simply
by making the unwilling parent a party to the proceeding. This
statutory provision is not intended to by-pass the objections of
the child's non-consenting parent but to permit a contest on
whether the non-consenter has been guilty of conduct forfeiting
parental rights.
The mere fact that the [mother] was made a party to
this action and duly served does not give the court the
authority to forfeit her rights as a parent of this child
without a judicial determination, upon a sufficient legal
ground, that [her] parental right should be forfeited
and severed and the best interest of the child will be
served and promoted [thereby]. 3 2
IV. Cmw ABANDOIMNT
It is now unlawful for any parent or guardian of a minor
child under sixteen to wilfully abandon the child.8 3 This new
statute appears to differ from earlier ones 4 in that it applies
to both parents, not just the father.
30. S.C. CODE AxN. § 10-2587.7(a) (Supp. 1968).
31. 165 S.E2d 269 (S.C. 1969).
32. Id. at 271.
33. R114, March 5, 1969, provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any parent, male or female, or any other
person legally responsible for the care and support of a minor child
under the age of sixteen years to wilfully abandon such child.
Any person violating the provisions of this act shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be punished
within the discretion of the court.
34. S.C. CODE A~x. §§ 15-1385 and 20-303 (1962) provided for punishment
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V. FA3r=Y CoURT Ruis
By virtue of the Family Court Act 5 a set of rules was adopted
to govern practice and procedure in the Family Courts.3 6
Twenty rules covering all aspects of procedure were promul-
gated; only the more important ones will be mentioned here.
Rule 7 provides for a child to be appointed an attorney in
delinquency cases if his family can't afford to retain one and if
"there is any probability that the child may be committed to an
institution or removed from the home of the parents.... ." Rule
10 states that children will not be allowed in the courtroom nor
will they be allowed to testify in-actions of parents against each
other except when the child's testimony is essential to establish
the acts alleged. An informal courtroom demeanor is provided
for in Rule 11. According to Rule 12 the following documents
and statements shall be admissable in evidence without the
presence of the person or institution issuing the document: (1)
a statement of school attendance signed by an authorized school
official; (2) a school report card; (3) a physician's statement of
treatment; (4) a home investigation report or any other report
required by the court; and (5) an employee's statement of earn-
ings. Rule 12 further permits contradictory evidence to be
offered by the party claiming prejudice by the admission of
these items. Rule 14 allows the judge to issue em parte orders
for temporary child support, temporary custody, and temporary
restraining orders to protect the child from damaging acts.
It should be noted that the Circuit Court Rules, 7 not the
new Family Court Rules, apply in adoption and divorce pro-
ceedings according to Rule 20.
ALLL.- R. Tnw
35. S.C. CODE Axr. §§ 15-1095 to -1095.52 (Supp. 1968).
36. S.C. F.u. CT. R. 1-20, Smith's Advance Sheet #29 (Dec. 7, 1968).
37. 15 S.C. CODE ANx. (1962).
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